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Before:   JORDAN, MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 







 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 




JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
On the morning of April 3, 2016, a train crashed into a worksite near Chester, 
Pennsylvania, causing deaths, injuries, and property damage.  The train was operated by 
the Appellee here, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”).  The 
Appellant, William Robinson, was a track foreman for Amtrak and was fired following 
the incident.  He sued Amtrak, alleging racial discrimination and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.1  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Amtrak.  
Robinson now appeals, and we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND  
Robinson, who is African-American, was the foreman on a track maintenance 
project near Chester, from the evening of April 2, 2016 to the morning of April 3, 2016.  
During his shift, he obtained for the tracks under construction something called “foul 
time,” a status used to prevent trains from entering a portion of track when work is being 
performed on it.  To obtain foul time, the foreman tells Amtrak’s dispatchers that work is 
being done on a track.  The foreman is supposed to use his radio to contact the dispatcher 
when obtaining and releasing foul time, to ensure that other employees can hear the 
communication with the dispatcher.  Only the foreman who obtains the foul time is 
 
1 Robinson also alleged that he was subject to a hostile work environment.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment against Robinson on that claim, and he has not 
raised any issue with respect to it on appeal, so we do not address it.  Skretvedt v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Co., 372 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue is waived 
unless a party raises it in its opening brief[.]”).  Further, in addition to Amtrak, Robinson 
sued the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, his union.  The Court granted 




permitted to release it.  Once released from foul time, the tracks are understood to be free 
for train traffic.  The foreman is thus required to ensure that the track is clear before 
releasing foul time.   
During his April 2nd to 3rd night shift, Robinson used his cellphone, rather than 
his radio, to obtain and release foul time.  John Yager, who is white, relieved Robinson as 
foreman on the morning of April 3, 2016.  When Robinson then called the dispatcher 
using his cellphone and released the foul time he had obtained, there was still work being 
done on one of the tracks.  He told the dispatcher that Yager would call to obtain foul 
time for the affected tracks.  Yager never contacted the dispatcher to obtain that foul 
time.  At approximately 7:50 a.m., Amtrak Train 89 proceeded at 100 mph down the 
track where work was still underway.  Two Amtrak employees were killed, and several 
other employees and passengers were injured.  Assistant Division Engineer Frank Kruse, 
who was responsible for track maintenance, construction, and inspection in the area 
where the crash occurred, immediately went to the scene of the accident.  He spoke with 
multiple employees involved in the accident and collected documentation.   
After the accident, Robinson, Yager, and two other employees who had been at the 
site requested and were afforded medical leave.  Amtrak initiated disciplinary 
proceedings against all four of those employees, alleging various violations of safety 
rules promulgated by Amtrak and other regulatory bodies.  Two of the employees 
voluntarily resigned from Amtrak without returning from medical leave.  Yager stayed on 
medical leave until he retired from Amtrak.   
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On April 13, 2017, Robinson voluntarily returned from medical leave and was 
immediately suspended with pay pending a disciplinary hearing on the alleged violations 
of the safety rules.  Amtrak scheduled Robinson’s disciplinary hearing for April 26, 2017.  
He was assigned a union representative.  An Amtrak employee from the Office of 
Disciplinary Investigation was appointed as the hearing officer and had authority to 
decide which witnesses would be permitted at the hearing and what documents Amtrak 
was required to produce.  The hearing officer denied Robinson’s request for his private 
attorney to be at the disciplinary hearing.  She granted his request for an Amtrak 
supervisor and a foreman to appear as witnesses, but both of them declined to attend.  
The only witness was Assistant Division Engineer Kruse.  The hearing officer later issued 
a decision finding that Robinson had violated various safety rules.  Amtrak then fired 
Robinson.     
Both the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) and the Federal Railroad 
Administration (“FRA”) also investigated the train collision.  The NTSB concluded that 
the accident likely would not have happened had Robinson and Yager communicated 
with the Amtrak dispatcher jointly.  The FRA recommended that Robinson “be 
disqualified from performing safety-sensitive service on a permanent basis.”  (Supp. App. 
at 551.) 
Robinson subsequently filed this suit against Amtrak, claiming racial 
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Amtrak.  As to 
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Robinson’s racial discrimination claims, the Court concluded that he had not met his 
burden to show that Amtrak’s proffered reason for terminating his employment was 
pretextual.  The Court also held that Robinson failed to sustain an emotional distress 
claim.   
Robinson has timely appealed.   
II. DISCUSSION2 
Robinson raises two issues before us.  First, he argues that there was a genuine 
dispute of material fact regarding whether race was a motivating factor in his termination.  
Second, he argues that Amtrak’s actions in blaming him for the April 3, 2016 collision 




The District Court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute of 
material fact regarding whether race was a motivating factor for Robinson’s termination 
and that Amtrak was entitled to summary judgment.  The McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework applies to claims of racial discrimination.3  Under that framework, 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “It is well established that we employ a 
plenary standard in reviewing orders entered on motions for summary judgment, applying 
the same standard as the district court.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 
265 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
3 The well-known burden shifting framework for discrimination cases was set 
forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973).  Robinson’s discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act are all analyzed 
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“the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) 
s/he is a member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought 
to attain or retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action 
occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional 
discrimination.”  Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).  If the plaintiff 
meets that burden, the burden of production shifts to the defendant “to articulate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”  Id.  If the 
defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff “to show that the 
defendant’s proffered reason is merely pretext for intentional discrimination.”  Id.  “To 
discredit the employer’s proffered reason, … the plaintiff cannot simply show that the 
employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken[.]”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  “Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action” that a reasonable jury could infer that the 
employer did not act because of the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.  Id. 
 Here, if we were to assume that Robinson had met his burden to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination, as the District Court assumed, he still has not met his burden 
to show that Amtrak’s proffered reason for his termination – that his violation of safety 
protocols contributed to a fatal train accident – was pretextual.  Robinson asserts that 
Amtrak’s proffered reason can be seen as pretextual because he was scapegoated for the 
 
using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.  Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 
198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).   
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accident.  He claims that Yager, who is white, was treated more favorably than he was, 
and that the disciplinary proceeding was unfair and manipulated by Kruse.  His 
protestations are unpersuasive. 
 First, Robinson’s assertion that he was singled out for his role in the collision does 
not demonstrate that Amtrak’s reason for firing him was a pretext for racial 
discrimination.  It is clear from Robinson’s own admissions that he violated various 
critical safety regulations, including by releasing foul time when he knew that the tracks 
were not clear and by using his cellphone rather than his radio to tell the dispatcher to 
release the foul time.  Deaths, injuries, and significant property damage followed.  Those 
undisputed facts are certainly sufficient for Amtrak to conclude that Robinson’s 
employment needed to be terminated, regardless of race. 
 Second, there is no factual support for Robinson’s claim that white employees 
were treated more favorably than he was.  “To show that discrimination was more likely 
than not a cause for the employer’s action, … the plaintiff may show …  that the 
employer has treated more favorably similarly situated persons not within the protected 
class.”  Simpson v. Kay Jewelers. Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 
1998).  Robinson argues that Yage was treated more favorably than he was, but the 
record shows otherwise.  Both he and Yager were allowed to take medical leave 
following the accident and both faced disciplinary charges based on it.  When Robinson 
returned from medical leave, any similarity between them ceased.  Yager took a longer 
medical leave and retired upon his return, whereas Robinson tried to return to active 
service and was fired.  Robinson cites no evidence that he was precluded from taking a 
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medical leave of similar length to Yager’s, and he simply did not have sufficient years of 
employment at Amtrak to retire when he returned from medical leave.  The undisputed 
facts demonstrate that Robinson was not treated unfavorably as compared to other 
employees. 
Third and finally, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding 
Robinson’s claim that a decision-maker – specifically Kruse – acted with a 
discriminatory motive.  Robinson argues that Kruse was protecting Yager and prevented 
Robinson from having a fair and impartial disciplinary hearing.  But Robinson fails to 
show that there was any connection between Kruse’s actions and Robinson’s race.  
Indeed, the minimal race-related evidence in the record does not involve Robinson or 
Kruse, and Robinson acknowledges that Kruse never made any racially derogatory 
remarks to him.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in deciding that Robinson had 
not shown that Amtrak’s reason for terminating him was pretextual and in granting 
summary judgment to Amtrak on Robinson’s racial discrimination claims. 
B 
 
The District Court also correctly concluded that Robinson did not make out a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Under Pennsylvania law, “[a]n 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires four elements: (1) the 
conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; 
(3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe.”  Bruffett v. 
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was “so 
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outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” 
Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).   
Robinson claims that Amtrak tortiously caused him emotional distress by 
scapegoating him for the April 3, 2016 collision and by manipulating the disciplinary 
proceedings against him.  “[I]t is extremely rare to find conduct in the employment 
context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for 
recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Id.  Here, Amtrak’s 
conduct was not outrageous and obviously did not rise to the level of outrageousness 
necessary to make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Robinson 
admitted to having a role – a very significant one – in a fatal accident.  There is nothing 
outrageous in an employer’s taking action to address derelictions of duty with such dire 
consequences.  
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Amtrak. 
